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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.**

**STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION MEETS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: DOD-DOS
COLLABORATION AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL**

by

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**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of
the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

Signature: _____

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Abstract

In a world in which America's enemies have become adept at exploiting the information environment to overcome American superiority in conventional weapons, logistics, strategy and tactics, the U.S. government finds itself faced with the possibility of winning the battle and losing the war because of our inability to effectively engage with foreign publics and influence international public opinion. Within the interagency, debate continues over a national strategy and appropriate command and control structure to best coordinate government-wide strategic communication (SC) programs. At the operational level, both the Departments of Defense and State have robust programs in place to promote U.S. policy, values and objectives. This paper posits that State's Public Diplomacy (PD) program has many characteristics of use to a Combatant Commander, especially during Phase 0 shaping of the environment operations, and that a formalized relationship between the two departments at the COCOM level would be mutually beneficial. The paper provides recommendations for DoD and DoS to implement to improve coordination and effectiveness within a CCDR's AOR.

It has always seemed to me the real art in this business is not so much moving information or guidance or policy five or ten thousand miles. The real art is to move it the last three feet in face-to-face conversation.

Edward R. Murrow¹

INTRODUCTION

This paper is concerned with the complementary relationship between Strategic Communication (SC), as it is understood and implemented at the operational level by the U.S. military and Department of Defense (DoD), and Public Diplomacy (PD), as it is practiced by American diplomats and professional communicators in the Department of State (DoS; State). In a world in which America's enemies have proven themselves adept at exploiting the information environment to overcome American superiority in conventional weapons, logistics, strategy and tactics, the U.S. government (USG) finds itself faced with the possibility of winning the battle and losing the war because of our inability to effectively engage with foreign publics and influence international public opinion. As the debate over definition and structure of interagency SC programs continues at the national level, DoD and State continue operating overseas without an overarching national strategy or SC command and control (C2) structure. Both departments have much to offer each other, however, and this paper sets out an argument and recommendations for formalizing SC/PD coordination at the DoD Combatant Command (COCOM)/DoS regional bureau level to better take advantage of these complementary capabilities and objectives.

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND THE INTERAGENCY

The concept of SC has existed in one form or another for centuries.² In the U.S., however, SC has become an area of focus at the highest levels in the current era since the end of the Cold War and, especially since the 9/11 attacks and subsequent Global War on Terror. Thanks in large part to the communications revolution - which allows for near-instantaneous sharing of information, music, video and photographs around the globe – our enemies have become expert communicators who understand the value of exploiting communications technology to outmaneuver us on the cognitive battlefield.

Many people define SC in many ways. Jeffrey Jones, who served as Director for Strategic Communication and Information in the National Security Council in the first administration of George W. Bush, defines it as "... the synchronized coordination of statecraft, public affairs, public diplomacy, military information operations, and other activities, reinforced by political, economic, military and other actions, to advance U.S. foreign policy objectives."³ This definition is useful as it emphasizes that true SC - i.e., at the strategic level – organically incorporates the four elements of national power: Diplomacy, Information, Military action and Economic (DIME) power.

Current joint doctrine defines SC as "focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power."⁴ This definition is important to our current discussion because it highlights a key attribute of SC – understanding of foreign audiences – which is sought by DoD and practiced as a fundamental function of PD by

DoS.

At the White House as well as at DoD and DoS, the promotion of SC/PD capabilities and government-wide coordination has been a priority since 9/11. However, due largely to bureaucratic turf battles⁵ and the inability of agencies across the government to agree both on a definition of SC and an acceptable C2 structure for interagency coordination, neither the Bush nor the Obama Administrations have been able to create a national SC strategy that clarifies C2 or formalizes interagency SC communication and collaboration.⁶ In the absence of such a strategy, the National Security Council (NSC) has been tasked under both Administrations to oversee what remains an informal, parochial interagency coordination process.

Congress has also tried unsuccessfully to find ways to impose a coordination mechanism on the agency stove piping and unilateral character of government SC programs. In September 2008, Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS) introduced legislation to establish a National Center for Strategic Communications (sic), "...an agency similar to the now defunct U.S. Information Agency,"⁷ which would house under one roof some of the current DoS PD functions along with the Broadcasting Board of Governors. The Director of the Center "would oversee an interagency panel of representatives from the other federal entities whose missions inherently involved strategic communications with foreign publics."⁸ The following year, Representative William Thornberry (R-TX) introduced into the House a bill to create a Center for Strategic Communication to act as a SC coordinating mechanism for DoD, State and other agencies.⁹ Representative Thornberry is also a co-founder, along with Representative Adam Smith (D-WA), of the Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Caucus established to "raise awareness

of the challenges facing strategic communication and public diplomacy and provide multiple perspectives on proposed solutions.”¹⁰

While neither bill was acted upon in their respective houses, later in 2009 Congress demonstrated its continued concern for the state of the nation’s SC efforts by inserting a reporting requirement on SC organization and activities into the FY 2009 National Defense Authorization Act. Responding to Section 1055 of that act, the White House and DoD submitted SC updates in early 2010.¹¹ While both reports acknowledged the need for improved interagency coordination, both rejected the idea of creating a separate coordinating entity with C2 over USG-wide programs and activities for SC/PD, preferring instead to retain the NSC as the convening authority for informal information-sharing and collaboration and to take action at the agency level to bolster cooperation with each other.¹² While other Obama-era DoD documents continue to call for improved interagency coordination,¹³ it seems clear that we will not see created a formalized C2 structure for interagency SC/PD during this Administration.

SC/PD COORDINATION AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

Despite the strategic-level gaps in interagency SC coordination, DoD and the U.S. military fully appreciate the importance of SC, and are committed to integrating SC at all levels of planning and execution of military activities as well as to coordinating with the interagency – especially State - in order to do so. Secretary Gates, in the aforementioned “Section 1055” report to Congress, the *DoD Report on Strategic Communication*, noted a number of DoD documents that confirm this approach, including the January 2009 *Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report*, and Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint*

Operation Planning, which characterizes SC as “a natural extension of strategic direction, and supports the President’s strategic guidance, the Secretary of Defense’s National Defense Strategy, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s National Military Strategy... This is an interagency effort, which provides an opportunity to advance US regional and global partnerships.”¹⁴

Toward this end, Geographic Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) have implemented DoD and joint guidance by incorporating SC formally into the operational-level joint planning process.¹⁵ However, to date CCDRs have taken an ad hoc approach to collaboration with State, and in so doing have missed opportunities to maximize collaboration with State and to benefit from complementarity between SC activities and DoS PD programs and capabilities.¹⁶ By taking the relatively simple steps recommended below to ensure formal linkages between CCDRs and DoS counterparts, both agencies would gain from improved communications and coordination of effort, programs and resources.

In the absence of a national strategy or formal interagency C2 mechanism, the extent to which CCDRs and staffs have communicated and coordinated with State counterparts has, not surprisingly, reflected the level of understanding of and appreciation for SC on the part of individual CCDRs. SOUTHCOM provides perhaps the most robust example in which successive commanders have emphasized the need for strong interagency coordination.¹⁷ Admiral James Stavridis, then-SOUTHCOM Commander, wrote in spring 2007 “... strategic communication is the ultimate team sport. It must be done as part of a joint, interagency, and commercial system. It does no good whatsoever to have a perfect strategic communication plan that is ultimately contradicted by other

U.S. agencies, as – unfortunately – is often the case. Each plan must be vetted carefully and hopefully become a combined effort.... This is an effort that must involve practitioners at the Department of Defense, Department of State, and indeed at all Cabinet organizations and national agencies engaged in international strategic communication on behalf of the United States.”¹⁸ In addressing the regional nature of a CCDR’s responsibilities, Admiral Stavridis also noted that “for a combatant commander, the place to “organize” strategic communication is at the operational level... a strategic plan operat(es) at the level of the entire theater, across time, space, language and culture.... After organizing at the operational level... we are operating at the individual national level. This is where all the components of the strategic communications plan must fit together, and most particularly our plan must be fully coordinated and synched up with the Embassy’s efforts.”¹⁹ In light of that vision of interagency coordination, the remainder of this paper will describe DoS PD capabilities, analyze the benefits to CCDRs of more formal coordination with State, and present some practical recommendations the two agencies should pursue to maximize SC/PD collaboration between CCDRs and State elements in the field and in Washington.

STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES OF DOS PD

While both sides would benefit from improved coordination, one of the biggest hurdles to overcome is the structural disconnect between DoD organization and the way in which DoS oversees and implements PD. By law, State is the lead USG agency for outreach to foreign publics, and does so through PD. According to the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Department’s PD

mission statement is to “support the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives, advance national interests, and enhance national security by informing and influencing foreign publics and by expanding and strengthening the relationship between the people and government of the United States and citizens of the rest of the world.”²⁰ To achieve this, Public Diplomacy Officers (PDOs) overseas engage primarily with host nation non-governmental actors, such as academics, the media, artists, NGOs, the business community, youth groups and opinion leaders. While PDOs are not restricted from engaging with government officials, their primary mandate is to conduct outreach to the non-governmental sectors of society who, in the communications age, increasingly influence public opinion as well as government policy and direction.

The structure of the PD arm of the State Department is unique due to the programmatic nature of PD activities and the history of the PD “cone,” or specialization, within the Foreign Service and Department of State.²¹ Until 1999, PD was practiced by employees of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), a sub Cabinet-level agency created in 1953 and integrated into State during the final years of the Clinton Administration. The overseas arm of USIA was known as USIS, the U.S. Information Service. Since consolidation with State, most overseas operations are now known within an embassy as the Office of Public Affairs, and PD officers serving abroad are formally (and interchangeably in practice and in this paper) known as Public Affairs Officers (PAOs).²²

PAOs use a variety of programs and PD products to conduct outreach activities equivalent, in OpArt terms, to Phase 0 operations, i.e., shaping the environment, by explaining and promoting American policy, values, culture and society to foreign audiences and influencing key audience institutions and individuals. Programs in this

category include: professional and academic exchanges such as the Fulbright and Humphreys Programs and the International Visitor Leadership Program; English Teaching; U.S. Speaker programs (which bring non-governmental experts in a wide variety of subjects to explain aspects of American society to foreign audiences); cultural programs such as musical groups, dance troupes, art exhibitions, and sports training; academic advising for foreign students desiring to study in the U.S.; the operation of American libraries and electronic Information Resource Centers; book translation programs; and grants to American and host country NGOs or academic/cultural institutions to conduct bilateral exchanges, capacity building training or other activities designed to increase mutual understanding and linkages between the U.S. and host country.

PAOs also work closely with local press and media (TV, radio, internet-based), foreign media resident in or visiting the host nation, and American journalists covering stories related to U.S. interests or foreign policy in a given country (this includes support to members of the traveling press affiliated with senior American officials). They act as Embassy spokespersons, making use of Department Press Guidance to explain U.S. policy, and provide press support to visiting senior Administration officials and U.S. delegations, organizing press events, processing official transcripts and running press centers for traveling American press who accompany senior VIPs.

Since the Kennedy Administration, American public diplomacy has been charged with a “second mandate,” to listen and learn from foreign contacts.²³ PDOs report regularly on developments in host nation society, on a wide range of topics such as education, freedom of the press, the arts and culture, NGO development, women’s issues,

environment, science and sports as they relate to individual freedoms and foreign attitudes towards the United States.

Two of the most important USIA-era products submitted to Washington by a PAO were the Institutional Analysis and the Country Plan.²⁴ The Institutional Analysis provided a snap shot of both the structure of a host nation's society and the key audience members (by institution and name) a PAO engaged with – the opinion makers and influence “gatekeepers.” Included in the Institutional Analysis was a Media Guide, a list of all media outlets and key journalists ranked and analyzed by their importance as opinion-makers in their society. The other major PD planning product was the annual Country Plan, through which a PAO explained to Washington the foreign policy priority issues and PD objectives a Public Affairs Section would pursue for the following year, and in which he would outline PD resource requirements as well as programming to be undertaken to reach these objectives.

Since consolidation into the Department of State in 1999, these reporting requirements have disappeared. However, PD officers still submit modified Institutional Analyses and Country Plans to Washington as informal planning tools (often in support of requests for information from Washington elements) to aid in their own planning and in justifying requests for PD resources. The same analytical methodology and information is now applied to derive PD input for the annual MSRP – the Mission Strategic Resource Plan – into which PD objectives are woven in support of the Country Team's MSRP themes and priorities. PA Sections also routinely submit Media Reaction reports to Washington which provide synopses of local media reporting –a useful product in monitoring both the local media climate as well as in identifying major trends and hot

issues in a host country. In addition, PD Officers justify their budget requests by submitting program results reporting via the Mission Activity Tracker (MAT) database to the Under Secretary's office.

Embassy PDOs work for the Ambassador and are key members of the Embassy Country Team (CT). As such, they belong to one of the Department's six regional bureaus, whose country "clientele" falls roughly into the same geographic boundaries as the geographic CCDRs' AORs²⁵. For purposes of policy and SC/PD coordination between DoD and DoS, this State regional construct is both understandable and useful to a CCDR – but only up to a point. State's culture, while reliant on a regional organizational structure, is bilateral in nature – and is especially so in regions in which there does not exist a predominant language or common cultural heritage such as Africa or East Asia. While a regional Assistant Secretary oversees policy for an entire region, in reality each Ambassador (and her CT) works independently from counterparts in neighboring countries. Most CCDRs recognize this distinction and have established country desks within their commands to liaise directly with the CTs found within the AOR. While country desks provide a CCDR direct and regular contact with the embassies found within his AOR (usually through the Embassy Defense Attaché), specific SC/PD links are rarely established.

Each DoS regional bureau includes a PD office headed by a PD Office Director (PDOD), a senior PD officer who acts as a public affairs/public diplomacy adviser to the Assistant Secretary. The PDOD works within the regional bureau and with other bureaus within State to ensure that embassy PD sections are responsive to policy in their outreach programming and press support. Equally important for the PAOs in the field, PDODs

also liaise with State's PD programmatic bureaus as well as the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, to whom these bureaus report.

In State nomenclature, the Under Secretary and her office are both known by the letter "R". R sets PD policy, oversees the PD budget (including allocations to embassies via the regional bureau PDODs), coordinates with other agencies (including DoD via the NSC-led interagency process), and supervises the three PD bureaus under her control – the Office of Public Affairs, which hosts the Department Spokesman, coordinates the Press Guidance process and engages with American press and foreign media resident in the United States; the Bureau for Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), which oversees cultural and educational programs and relations; and the Bureau for International Information Programs (IIP), which runs the U.S. Speaker program, Department PD websites (in eight languages), and produces a variety of written PD products used by the field to promote U.S. policy and values.²⁶ Close ties with Department regional bureaus can help CCDRs and their staffs coordinate on both policy and SC/PD from Washington.

As the above discussion demonstrates, State's PD C2 structure is convoluted and at odds with that of DoD: a State PAO in the field works directly for his/her Ambassador as part of the CT, looks to the PDOD housed within the State regional bureau for overall policy guidance and lobbying support with R for resources, and coordinates directly with the R family of PD bureaus on programs and products that support CT PD objectives. He may collaborate regionally with counterparts in other U.S. Embassies, but only when doing so makes sense in a bilateral context.

BENEFITS TO OPERATIONAL-LEVEL SC

It is widely recognized that State and DoD have different cultures and time horizons. Embassies are established in countries to develop and maintain bilateral relations with a host nation for the long haul. While DoD is action-oriented, diplomats may consider the status quo to be preferable or measure progress in longer-term, more nuanced ways than military counterparts would. Given these differences, embassy PD operations can be useful to COCOM SC programs. Most PDOs are assigned to an embassy for three years, and an important part of their job is to become experts on the culture and society of their host country. Embassies hire support staff, known as Locally Employed Staff (LES), in part to provide long-term continuity in support of bilateral ties. PAOs, as a rule, supervise highly educated and “connected” LES because of their knowledge of local society and their ability to help interpret changes to the local scene.²⁷ Through programs, local expertise and planning/reporting products such as the MSRP, Media Guide, Country Plan and Institutional Analysis, daily Media Reaction and reporting cables on various topics, the PAO and her staff represent a tremendous resource for CCDRs and their staffs. As CJCS Admiral Mullen has written, “... more important than any particular tool, we must know the context within which our actions will be received and understood... we must also be better listeners.”²⁸ State PD capabilities can help the CCDR meet this goal.

PDOs structure their activities under two main categories – culture and press/information. Roughly speaking, the cultural side of the equation (e.g., exchange programs, performing arts initiatives, exhibits, outreach to NGOs, libraries, book

translation programs), offer opportunities for collaboration in support of Phase 0 operations, i.e., shaping the environment. Close contact between Combatant Command (COCOM) planners involved in Theater Strategic Cooperation (TSC) and PAOs, for example, can yield interesting programmatic opportunities to use PD to engage host nation military personnel in support of TSC objectives – as well as assist PAOs to meet their own objectives.²⁹

The Information and Press operations of a PD shop offer entrée into the media world of a host country through extensive contact and experience working with local and foreign press as well as the host nation Ministry of Information. PAOs and their LES press assistants can open doors and cut through red tape in support of military public affairs, and during all phases of military operations can be invaluable to COCOM staff in executing PA responsibilities. The PDO's second mandate - listening and understanding local cultures – offers yet another way in which COCOM SC can benefit from closer collaboration with State.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Taken together, the PD palette represents a very useful resource to COCOM staffs. The problem lies in formalizing operational-level coordination between CCDRs and State in the absence of an interagency structure to ensure maximum collaboration at the regional level and to overcome the disconnect in SC/PD organizational structures. The following recommendations represent practical steps that should be taken between the two agencies to ensure continuity of collaboration in all AORs to account for staff rotation in COCOMs and the U.S. embassies located within their AORs.

1. State currently assigns Political Advisors (POLADS) to each COCOM.

These diplomats may be useful as advisors and DoS policy liaison for CCDRs, but as senior Political and Economic officers (by and large), they do not come from the PD world and therefore neither “think PD” nor understand how to manipulate the DoS PD levers. State should, therefore, assign mid-level (05 and 06-equivalent) PD officers to COCOM staffs to serve as advisors, members of SC and TSC planning staffs, and as direct liaison officers to CTs in the AOR. These officers would work directly with Embassy PAOs in the region and liaise with Washington PD elements in support of SC/PD coordination in the AOR.

2. In turn, DoD should assign military officers to the staffs of State regional Assistant Secretaries. These officers, who would be most effective if placed in the PD office of each regional bureau, would serve as advisors to the bureau’s PDOD on region-wide SC policy and initiatives, and would liaise with their COCOM colleagues (including the embedded PD officer) and State PA/PD elements (i.e., R staff and the PA, ECA and IIP Bureaus) specifically to coordinate SC/PD programs on behalf of their COCOM.

3. Relevant COCOM staff officers should conduct consultations at Main State at the beginning of their tour.³⁰ Consultations should be held with the PDOD and relevant PD bureaus to understand State PD operations within the relevant geographic bureau, resources and areas of potential collaboration/coordination. PDODs should also travel to their relevant COCOM headquarters for similar consultations.

4. CCDRs should include SC/PD issues among the list of priority topics for consultations with senior DoS officials, and should include meetings with the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy during these consultations.

5. Embassies already routinely share the MSRP with the COCOM. PAOs should be required to clear their MSRP input with relevant COCOM staff (ideally with the assigned PD liaison officer) before submission to the CT for the final product. Embassy PAOs should also routinely add their COCOM as an addressee on Media Reaction cables and any other relevant reporting cables, and share Country Plans, Institutional Analyses and Media Guides with COCOM SC/TSC planners.

6. CCDRs should ensure that DOD assets are offered on a regular basis to PDOs in their region as part of Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD). Such assets could include musical groups, sports teams, and subject matter experts that could be programmed to Embassy contacts as well as host nation military forces. Besides providing a program resource plus-up to CTs to help broaden their outreach capabilities, doing so would benefit COCOM TSCs by reaching wider host nation audiences in different venues and formats and by obtaining political legitimacy (or “cover”) through association with a recognized Embassy program. As Secretary Gates noted in his Section 1055 report to Congress, DSPD activities are coordinated with State “...either at the country team level or at the Washington interagency level.”³¹ Working through PD liaison officers on COCOM staffs and DoD liaison officers on DoS regional bureau staffs would ensure better communication and coordination of DSPD activities at the operational level.

7. DoD should broaden War College participation to include members of the media, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international governmental organizations (IGOs) with which COCOMs and PAOs work on a regular basis in order to educate these important interlocutors/partners on the capabilities, structure, and values of

U.S. military forces and to provide an understanding of operational planning. COCOM staffs should request AOR Embassy PAOs to nominate relevant contacts. Just as foreign military graduates form a network useful to worldwide military planning and TSC objectives, these categories of graduates would form an alumni group potentially sympathetic and conversant in operational planning processes and motivations, leading to improved linkages to the global press, NGO and IGO communities with whom DoD and DoS must work.

COUNTERARGUMENT AND REBUTTAL

Some will argue that the current ad hoc arrangements between DoD and DoS suffice to allow for cooperation at the operational level, noting the presence of State Political Advisors (POLADs) on the staffs of CCDRs as evidence of existing C2 structures that facilitate coordination between the two agencies. In addition, critics will point to the existence of a certain level of organizational effectiveness between COCOMs and DoS in the absence of a national SC strategy as proof that the current state of interagency coordination works.

These arguments are both shortsighted and specious. Senior leaders in both agencies as well as the White House have recognized that in the absence of a national strategy, more needs to be done to improve collaboration and that SC/PD personnel exchanges are fundamental to this improved coordination. According to Secretary Gates' report to Congress, "DoD is currently conducting a Strategic Communication Capabilities-Based Assessment to determine the degree to which existing capabilities are sufficient or need to be enhanced and to identify best practices for strategic

communication at the Combatant Command level.”³² State’s R office published a roadmap for PD in the 21st century in March 2010, noting that “structures for interagency coordination for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication efforts need strengthening,” and that “detail positions and embedding (in DHS, DoD and USAID) will create closer linkages and improve understanding of partners’ capabilities to better plan for collaborative whole-of-government approaches.”³³ In addition, the current level and structure of DoD-DoS coordination is inadequate because it does not take into account the much greater degree of cooperation possible if both agencies brought to bear full SC/PD capabilities at the COCOM level through improved coordination and formalized communications links involving SC/PD experts.

FINAL REMARKS

With the advent of modern communications technologies, public opinion in the post-Cold War period has reached an unprecedented level of influence on the actions and policies of governments. For a military force, this means that battles must be fought as much on the airwaves as on the battlefield, and that cognitive objectives are as important as physical ones. DoD recognizes this new reality and has developed significant SC capabilities as well as doctrine to incorporate SC into all levels of planning and operations. The DoS, through its PD programs and activities, is an important partner in the interagency SC effort. While somewhat hampered at the national level for lack of an interagency SC strategy and – perhaps more importantly – C2 structure, these two leading agencies can work together in significant ways to obtain SC goals within a CCDR’s AOR. Recognizing that the cultures and even geographic approaches of State and DoD

differ, it is possible to improve coordination and collaboration at the COCOM/regional bureau level through the implementation of a number of relatively simple steps.

These changes require minimal investment of resources and only a limited investment in political will to implement. Heretofore ad hoc coordination arrangements show that improved coordination between the two agencies can be achieved and produce results. All that is needed is institutional implementation at the operational level to ensure that the benefits of interagency cooperation become part of the organizational status quo.

¹ Edward R. Murrow, interview by journalist Edward P. Morgan, quoted in Hans N. Tuch. *Communicating with the World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 26.

² Hans N. Tuch, *Communicating with the World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 3.

³ Jeffrey B. Jones, "Strategic Communication: A Mandate for the United States," *Joint Force Quarterly*, issue 39, 4th Quarter 2005.

⁴ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*: (Washington, D.C., 12 April 2001 [as amended through 31 July 2010]), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1-02.pdf, (accessed October 5, 2010).

⁵ Helle C. Dale, “Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications Review: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” Heritage Foundation, *WebMemo*, No. 2840, 22 March 2010, <http://report.heritage.org/wm2840> (accessed September 22, 2010).

⁶ USGAO, “U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by Lack of a National Communication Strategy,” Washington, DC: USGAO Highlights GAO-05-323, April 2005, <http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?/GAO-05-323> (accessed September 23, 2010).

⁷ Office of Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS), “Brownback Introduces Public Diplomacy Legislation,” Washington, DC: September 23, 2008, <http://brownback.senate.gov/pressapp/record.cfm?id=303440> (accessed 18 October 2010).

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Strategic Communication Act of 2009, H.R. 489, 111th Cong., 1st sess., <http://www.opencongress.org/bill/III-h489/show>, accessed 21 October 2010.

¹⁰ Matthew Armstrong, “Congress Steps Up: a Caucus for Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy,” *MountainRunner*, entry posted 7 March 2010, http://mountainrunner.us/2010/03/scpd_caucus.html (accessed 21 October 2010).

¹¹ See U.S. President, *National Framework for Strategic Communication*. Washington, DC: White House, 2010, and U.S. Department of Defense, *Report on Strategic Communication*. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, December 2009 for full texts of the two reports.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2010, <http://www.defense.gov/qdr> (accessed October 11, 2010).

¹⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *Report on Strategic Communication*. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, December 2009, 2.

¹⁵ See Jeffrey B. Jones, et. al., Russell, “Strategic Communication and the Combatant Commander” Washington, D.C.: *Joint Force Quarterly*, issue 55, 4th Quarter 2009 for a thorough discussion of the Combatant Commander’s role in prioritizing SC within his command.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ See SOUTHCOM’s website for detailed level of Interagency engagement, at <http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/pages/interagency.php> (accessed 22 October 2010). Michael E. Parmly, former head of the U.S. Interest Section in Havana, in an email message to author, 20 October 2010, confirmed that the two commands coordinated “intensely and continuously” during his tenure in Havana.

¹⁸ James G. Stavridis, “Strategic Communication and National Security.” Washington, D.C.: *Joint Force Quarterly*, issue 46, 3rd Quarter 2007, 7.

¹⁹ Ibid., 6.

²⁰ U.S. Department of State, *Public Diplomacy: Strengthening U.S. Engagement with the World – A Strategic Approach for the 21st Century*, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, March 2010), 3.

²¹ The other cones include Political Affairs, Economic Affairs, Management and Consular Affairs. The Foreign Service also includes specialists such as Special Agents

(security officers), English Teaching Specialists, and Communicators, and refers in common parlance only to the diplomatic corps under the Department of State. USAID, the Department of Agriculture (Foreign Agricultural Service), and the Department of Commerce (Foreign Commercial Service) administer their own branches of the Foreign Service.

²² The use of this term in the overseas context is, quite understandably, a source of confusion for State Department and military personnel alike, who - rightly - associate the term Public Affairs with domestic press operations (in Washington, State differentiates between PAOs, who are in positions involving press guidance and domestic audiences, and PDOs, whose duties concern support for PD operations overseas or the promotion of U.S. policy to foreign audiences). State colleagues frequently do not understand the full range of duties undertaken by a PDO, and often use incorrectly the terms PDO/PAO and PD/PA.

²³ Hans N. Tuch, op. cit., 44-49.

²⁴ See David L. Hitchcock, "Making U.S. Public Diplomacy Work," Public Diplomacy Alumni Association, entry posted 21 March 2009,

<http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/104.htm> (accessed 18 October 2010) for a good comparative description of PD operations under USIA and under State.

²⁵ The six State regional bureaus are WHA (Western Hemisphere Affairs, which includes Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean, Central and South America), EUR (European and Eurasian Affairs), AF (African Affairs, including Mauritius and Madagascar), SCA (South and Central Asian Affairs), NEA (Near Eastern Affairs, including North Africa), and EAP (East Asian and Pacific Affairs, including Oceania). See <http://www.state.gov/countries/> for more information.

²⁶ See <http://www.state.gov/r/> for a detailed breakdown of the structure and duties of the various functional PD bureaus.

²⁷ In every mission in which I have served PD LES have been at the highest level of the pay scale within the embassy, reflecting their education, expertise and value as interpreters of the local scene.

²⁸ Michael G. Mullen, "Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics," Washington, D.C.: *Joint Force Quarterly*, issue 55, 4th Quarter 2009, 4.

²⁹ While serving as PAO Muscat, Oman, I worked closely with the Third Marine Airwing Band to coordinate repeat tours to Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain and the UAE.

³⁰ One such collaborative program could be the use of the International Visitor Leadership Program (which is coordinated between PDOs in the field and ECA staff in Washington) to bring COCOM priority foreign military contacts in different countries to the United States on a themed (e.g., human rights and the military) exchange program to learn about American values and society. Each COCOM could be given the chance to develop a program annually, and embassy PD offices in each AOR would administer the program for the COCOM.

³¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Report on Strategic Communication*. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, December 2009, 2.

³² Ibid., p. 4

³³ U.S. Department of State, op. cit., 17, 19

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